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Productive inefficiency in patriarchal family farms: 
evidence from Mali 
 
 
By Tatiana Goetghebuer (University of Namur-CRED) 
 
 
Abstract:  In  Mali,  there  exist  various  farm-cum-family  structures,  so  that  agricultural 
production occurs on plots controlled by different members of the household.  In this paper, 
we  want  to  lay  emphasis  on  the  under-researched  differentials  between  collective  and 
individual plots (attended by male or female farmer) in the context of extended family farms 
using input and output first hand data collected in the south-eastern part of Mali. First, we 
find that land yields are significantly larger on (male) private plots than on common plots 
with similar characteristics planted to the same crop in the same year after all appropriate 
controls have been included.  And, second, we bring strong suggestive evidence that a moral-
hazard-in-team problem exists on the collective fields (yet only with regard to care-intensive 
crops) that could explain their relatively poor performance. 
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There has been a recent surge of interest in African family farms where common plots that 
are  collectively  managed  and  worked  coexist  with  private  plots  held  and  cultivated  by 
individual members.  On the one hand, economists have tried to understand the rationale 
behind the existence of various forms of farm-cum-family structures. Their theories aim at 
explaining either the shift from a pure collective farm to a mixed structure in which private 
and  common  plots  coexist,  or  the  split  of  the  collective  farm  into  individual  units  (see 
Fafchamps, 2001, for an explanation of the former, Foster and Rosenzweig, 2002, for an 
explanation of the latter, and Guirkinger and Platteau, 2011a, for an explanation of both).  On 
the  other  hand,  many  studies  have  compared  the  productivity  of  plots  (with  similar 2 
 
characteristics) controlled by different types of farmers across households or more frequently 
within the same household.  A large number of these studies have identified systematic gender 
productivity differentials: ceteris paribus, men tend to be more productive than women (Udry et 
al., 1995; Udry, 1996; Bindlish, 1993, all dealing with Burkina Faso; Goldstein and Udry, 2008, 
for Ghana; Sidhar, 2008 for Nepal; Holden et al. (2001) for Ethiopia; Jacoby (1992) for Peru; 
Koru and Holden, 2011 for Uganda).
1    
Much fewer studies have compared land yields between collectively and (male) individually 
cultivated plots. Kanzianga and Wahhaj (2010) compare productivity of senior male plots 
(assumed to be collectively farmed) with junior male private plots and female private plots 
using first-hand data from Burkina Faso. They show that plots owned by the household head 
(common plots) are farmed more intensively and achieve higher yields than plots with similar 
characteristics  owned  by  other  household  members.    Yet,  they  do  not  find  any  gender 
differences in productivity once they compare male and female family members who do not 
head the household.   
In  this  paper,  we  want  to  lay  emphasis  on  the  under-researched  differentials  between 
collective and individual plots (male or female) in the context of extended family farms.  
There are three different views or theories explaining why such differentials may exist or not.  
First, if certain activities are subject to scale economies while others are not, it seems natural 
to practice the former on collective plots and the latter on private plots.  This consideration is 
used by Foster and Rosenzweig (2002) to explain the persistence of large collective farms 
when scale economies (and savings associated with the financing of household public goods) 
outweigh the advantages of land tenure individualization (split households) stemming from 
diverging preferences over these household public goods.  On the other hand, Boserup (1965) 
finds that when farmers adopt relatively land-saving and labour-using techniques for which 
quality  of  labour  matters  (labour  is  costly  to  monitor),  so  that  significant  management 
diseconomies  exist,  the  advantage  of  private  farming  on  individual  plots  increases.  
Interestingly,  it  has  been  shown  that  in  Hungarian  cooperatives  before  the  collapse  of 
communism, care-intensive activities were left for households to conduct on their private 
plots whereas activities easy to standardize and monitor remained the province of collective 
work on the cooperative fields (Swain, 1985; Guillaume, 1987; see also Chayanov, 1991: 
                                                           
1 Note that in these studies, male plots include both collective and private holdings without the authors 
being able to distinguish systematically between them.  As for female plots, the problem is more 
simple since they are private, except for the rare cases of female-headed households.   
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Chap. 13).  If this line of interpretation is correct, we should observe that different crops are 
grown on collective and private fields and we should not expect significant differences in 
land productivity between them. 
Second, Kanzianga and Wahhaj (2010) emphasize the public character of the good produced 
on the family field while potential scale economies are ignored.  The main originality of their 
theory  consists in assuming the existence of social norms that govern production on this 
collective field.  Since  collective production is thus aimed at providing a public good at 
family level, the members of the household are expected to be more willing to work on the 
collective field than on their private plots.  It follows that common plots managed by the 
household head should use family labour more intensively, and achieve higher yields than 
plots with similar characteristics farmed by individual members. This prediction is confirmed 
by  their  results  obtained  from  an  analysis  of  data  coming  from  a  survey  of  agricultural 
households in Burkina Faso.   
Finally, guided by field observations in Mali, Guirkinger and Platteau (2011a) argue that 
production  on  the  collective  plots  is  plagued  by  the  moral-hazard-in-team  problem  while 
first-best efficiency is achieved on private plots where members have optimal incentives to 
work.  The possible coexistence of the two types of plots is explained as the outcome of a 
trade-off between rent capture and efficiency considerations: acting as a patriarch, the head is 
concerned with extracting a rent from collective production since he is unable to enforce 
transfers from the private plots managed individually by the (male) members.  These private 
plots  are  awarded  to  members  when  land  scarcity  becomes  high  enough  to  compel  the 
patriarch/head to pay attention to efficiency considerations owing to the need to meet the 
members’ reservation utilities.  This particular prediction has been put to test and confirmed 
in  another  paper  based  on  first-hand  data  collected  in  the  south-eastern  part  of  Mali 
(Guirkinger  and  Platteau,  2011b).    In  complete  contrast  to  Kanzianga  and  Wahhaj’s 
argument, the other prediction of the theory of patriarchal family is that land yields should be 
larger on private than on common plots.  It is worth stressing that, given his concern to reap a 
rent from the collective field, the patriarch is not interested in achieving first-best allocative 
efficiency on the whole family farm.  Efficiency considerations enter (partly) into the picture 
only as a constraint imposed by scarce land endowments. 
In the same line, the theory of agricultural cooperatives has advanced the idea that collective 
farming acts as a mechanism of insurance to the extent that its output is shared equally among 
the members, thus redistributing income from lucky to unlucky members (Putterman and 
DiGiorgio, 1985; Carter, 1987).  At the same time, the rule of equal sharing gives rise to a 4 
 
moral-hazard-in-team  problem,  hence  a  trade-off  between  efficiency  and  risk-sharing 
considerations.  This line of reasoning has been recently extended to family farms (Delpierre 
et al., 2011).  The prediction regarding productivity differentials is exactly the same as under 
Guirkinger and Platteau’s argument: yields are expected to be smaller on the collective fields 
and these lower yields are the price to pay for insurance. 
On the basis of a detailed analysis of input and output data collected from the same survey as 
that used in Guirkinger and Platteau (2011b), this paper aims at testing whether there are 
significant differences in land yields between collective and (male) individual plots.  The next 
step consists of investigating the possible causes of yield differentials if they turn out to exist.  
We find that yields are higher on private than on collective plots with similar characteristics 
and planted to the same crop within the same household.  We also find strong suggestive 
evidence that a moral-hazard-in-team problem exists on the collective fields, yet only with 
regard to care-intensive crops. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, the characteristics of the 
original survey that yielded the dataset used in this paper are described, and basic information 
about farm and family structures as well as about patterns of land allocation between crops in 
the study area is provided.  In Section 3, the input and output data available to us, and their 
limitations, are discussed in detail before descriptive statistics about the key variables used in 
the subsequent econometric analysis are presented and briefly commented.  In Section 4, we 
address the first aforementioned question, that is, we test for the possible existence of yield 
differentials between (male) individual and  collective plots.   In Section 5, we attempt to 
determine  whether  the  lower  yields  obtained  on  collective  plots  can  be  attributed  to  the 
moral-hazard-in-team problem. The last section concludes. 
2. Key information about the survey and the structure of the sample farms 
The survey 
The data used in this paper is first hand data collected in the southeastern region of Mali in 
2007.  An interesting feature of this region is that family farms appear to be in a state of flux: 
traditional collective farms headed by a patriarch are still widespread although there is an 
increasing tendency toward more individualized forms of cultivation.  We randomly sampled 
17 villages in the three districts of Koutiala, Sikasso and San, which belong to the old cotton 
zone of Mali. Within each village, we randomly selected 12 households from a complete 
listing of the local household population.  Two survey instruments were used to elicit the 5 
 
required information.  First, a questionnaire was administered to each household head.  In 
addition  to  detailed  information  on  the  composition  of  the  household,  we  collected 
information on the size and structure of the associated farm, which includes the listing of the 
common fields managed by the family as a whole, as well as all the family members who 
cultivate private plots.   
Second,  a  questionnaire  was  addressed  to  a  random  sample  of  private plot  holders.   We 
initially  intended  to  cover  all  these  individual  farmers,  yet  due  to  our  time  and  budget 
constraints  only  two-thirds  of  them  (68%)  could  be  interviewed.
2    The  selection  of  the 
sampled individual farmers was made randomly by a qualified researcher from the CRED 
(Centre  for  Research  in  Economic  Development,  university  of  Namur)  acting  as  field 
supervisor.
3  A significant portion of the interview time was allotted to the collection of 
output and input data.  Information regarding all the common plots was obtained from the 
head within the framework of the general household questionnaire while data pertaining to 
the private plots were gathered from their holders within the framework of the individual 
questionnaires.  In order to have a more complete view of the household modus operandi, 
precise qualitative questions were asked about the different rights and duties of the household 
members, and about the pros and cons of collective versus mixed farm structures. 
Farm and family structures 
A household is a group of individuals who “work jointly on at least one common field under 
the  management  of  a  single  decision-maker  and  draw  an  important  share  of  their  staple 
foodstuffs from one or more granaries which are under the control of that same decision-
maker”  (Matlon,  1988  cited  in  Udry  1996:  1016).    “Traditionally,  a  West  African  rural 
household is large and complex. It extends both vertically (in the sense that married sons 
continue to live with their father) and horizontally (brothers of the head, their wives and 
children are part of the household)” (Guirkinger and Platteau, 2011b). In our sample 41.2% 
of household heads live with their brothers while, at the other extreme, only 21.6% have 
neither brothers nor married sons around (strictly speaking, they are nuclear households). 
Moreover, more than half of the household heads are polygamous. On average, the sample 
households count 11 individuals above 12 years old with a maximum family size of 30.  
                                                           
2 On an average, the interview of a household comprising only collective family fields lasted half a 
day while the interview of a household with a mixed farm structure lasted a whole day, the second 
half being devoted to the interviews of private plot holders. 
3 We believe that we do not have any biased sample of private plot holders since we do not find any 
systematic differences between interviewed individual farmers and those who have not been selected.  6 
 
Extended households managing collective farms remain a characteristic feature in Mali and, 
in particular, in the study area. However, over the last decades mixed farm structures have 
emerged  in  which  individual  plots  coexist  with  the  collective  family  field.  On  the  latter, 
members continue to work as a team and the output is shared among all the co-workers after 
the head has retained his own portion. The incomes that have been individually obtained are 
rarely transfered to the patriarch.  
It deserves to be noted that the practice of private plots granted to women is much older than 
the practice of private plots granted to men, and in fact, the rationale behind the two practices 
differ. Women holding private plots (also called “garden plot”) are expected to use them at 
least in part for the benefit of the family (producing condiments for collective meals) and are 
generally freed from the duty to work on the collective field. Male private plots holders are 
typically  allowed  to  keep  the  whole  output  for  themselves  (mainly  used  for  non-food 
expenditures),  but  still  contribute  to  the  family  production  on  the  common  plots.    It  is 
somewhat  revealing,  in  this  respect,  that  nearly  nine-tenths  of  the  male  members  of  the 
household who are older than 18 years of age work on the collective fields, as against only 
hardly more than half for female members. Also to be noted is that in mixed farms, all male 
members above a certain age are typically granted a plot and that we do not observe any 
adoption of new agricultural techniques among these individual farmers.  
Our sample includes 204 farms evenly spread over 17 villages. As it is evident from Table 1, 
58  households  (28.5%)  are  purely  collective  farms.  It  means  that  their  cultivated  land 
exclusively  consists  of  jointly  managed  fields.  Out  of  the  remaining  146  households,  69 
(47%)  have  distributed  individual  plots  to  female  members  only,  while  63  (43%)  have 
awarded such plots to both male and female members.  
   7 
 
Table 1: Structure of the sample farm households.  





Purely collective farms   58  28.5 
Mixed farms   146  71.5 
          With male and female IP*     63  43.1 
          With only male IP*      14  9.6 
         With only female IP*     69  47.3 
Total   204  100 
*IP: Individual Plots 
In Table 2, we provide information about the number of plots distinguished on the basis of 
three characteristics: whether they are collective or individual; in the latter instance, whether 
they belong to male or female household members; and whether they are of a high or a low 
quality. In addition, the number of respondents corresponding to each land plot category is 
supplied in column 4. We thus see that our sample includes 488 collective fields and 535 
private plots, out of which 71% belong to female household members and 29% belong to 
male household members. From a comparison of the third and fourth columns, it is apparent 
that, on average, a private plot farmer holds slightly more than one plot in the mixed farms 
(94% of these individual farmers hold a single plot). In contrast, there is an average of 2.4 
collective fields per farm household.  In the last two columns of the table, we provide the 
average size of collective and private plots and the average size of collective and private 
holdings when all the plots forming them are aggregated. Two facts emerge: (i) the average 
size  of  collective  landholdings  is  considerably  larger  than  the  average  size  of  private 
holdings, and (ii) the average size of private male plots is nearly twice as large as that of 
female plots. 
Table 2: Description of the sampled plots 
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Male plot  83  71  154  133  0.66 (1.22)  0.77 (1.46) 
Female plot  185  196  381  326  0.35 (0.50)  0.41 (0.56) 
Total  707  316  1023  663  2.35 (4.13)  3.62 (6.18) 
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Any study dealing with land productivity has to give great attention to quality variations 
between plots.  Usually, farmers are well aware of differences in land fertility and quite able 
to precise the quality characteristics of each of their plots according to features that they are 
familiar with.  During our field survey, farmers were unable to point to any subtle grading of 
land quality that did not verge on the idiosyncratic.  What they all agreed on was the critical 
importance of the distinction between dry lands and bottom lands.  Dry lands are lands that 
can  be  farmed  only  during  the  rainy  season  because  they  entirely  depend  on  rainfall  for 
bringing moisture to the soil.  Bottom lands, by contrast, correspond to plots located in a 
flood-recession area or irrigable with a well, so that they can be possibly cultivated beyond 
the rainy season and allow the growing of more water-demanding crops, such as vegetables.   
The difference in allocation of land with respect to quality is considerable when we compare 
collective with private plots: whereas 10 percent of the former consist of bottom lands, the 
proportion works out to 50 percent for the latter (a proportion that does not perceptibly vary 
between male and female plots).  The difference in land area between the two types of plots 
would thus be significantly reduced if we would allow for quality variations. As will be 
explained later, we have a reliable way of overcoming the rough definition of our land quality 
variable, and this way consists of controlling for the kind of crop grown on particular plots.  
Table 3 that depicts the type of relationship existing between the individual plot holder and 
the head of the household shows that, in our survey area, families may have quite a complex 
structure.  In particular, they may not only extend vertically by including several successive 
generations, but also horizontally by including brothers of the head with their wife (or wives) 
and children.  About half of the female private plots belong to spouses of the head while male 
private plots are more or less equally distributed between sons, brothers, nephews of the 
head, and the head himself.  We may incidentally note that in purely collective farms, the 
total land area and the total family size are significantly smaller than in mixed farms.  In the 
latter, the family has typically a more complex structure than in the former. 
   9 
 
Table 3: Individual farmer’s relationship to the household head  
Relationship to the head 
Nr of 
 Individual farmers 
% 
Head himself  37  8.1 
Spouse  142  30.9 
Sister/ sister in law  60  13.1 
Mother  16  3.5 
Daughter/daughter in law  63  13.7 
Cousin/niece in law  45  9.8 
Brother /step brother  28  6.1 
Son  39  8.5 
Cousin/nephew   29  6.3 
Total nr of individual farmers  459  100 
 
It  is  also  noteworthy  that  when  private  plots  are  awarded  to  male  members,  all  of  them 
typically receive a plot provided that they are married.  It directly follows that the head does 
not  earmark  private  plots  for  members  with  special  characteristics,  relatively  skilled  and 
hard-working members, for example.   
Land allocation between crops 
Table A.1, displayed in Appendix A, supplies a detailed account of the distribution of the 
lands of the household between the available crops during the rainy season.  Bearing in mind 
that a given plot, whether collective or individual, may be dedicated to more than one crop, 
we note  a number of tendencies.  When  all types of plot are clubbed together, sorghum 
appears  as  the  most  important  crop  in  terms  of  frequency  of  cultivation,  followed  by 
groundnuts, millet, maize, rice and cotton.  In terms of area, cotton stands foremost, followed 
by sorghum, millet, and niebe.  Rice and groundnuts are generally cultivated on relatively 
small areas (about half a hectare).  On the collective fields, sorghum comes first, followed by 
millet, maize, cotton and groundnuts, if frequencies of cultivation are considered.  In terms of 
area, cotton precedes sorghum, niebe and millet.  On the private plots, we have, respectively: 
groundnuts, rice, red chili, and sorghum in frequency terms, and cotton, maize, sorghum, and 
millet in area terms.    Women tend to specialize in rice  and  groundnuts (but in terms of 
cultivated area, rice and maize are predominant) whereas men tend to give preference to the 
production of groundnuts and red chili (but cotton, sorghum, maize, and groundnuts dominate 
in terms of cultivated area). 
Two features revealed by Table A.1 deserve special attention.  First, cereals are produced not 
only on the collective fields but also on the private plots.  Second, we do not observe any 10 
 
complete crop specialization according to the type of plot.  Groundnuts and sorghum, in 
particular, but also rice, maize, and millet to a lesser extent, are cultivated on both collective 
fields and private plots.  In the light of this finding, we can dismiss the hypothesis according 
to which the coexistence of collective and individual plots is due to the operation of scale 
economies on the former and scale (management) diseconomies on the latter.  
Table A.2 (in Appendix A) completes the picture by showing the cropwise distribution of 
household lands during the dry season.  Since farming is only feasible on the bottom lands 
during the rainy season and there are not many of those lands that are collectively cultivated, 
Table A.2 essentially describes the situation on private plots.  Onions appear as the most 
commonly cultivated crop in terms of frequency (for both men and women), followed by 
sweet potatoes and groundnuts, whereas potatoes predominate in terms of cultivated area.    
It  remains  to  compare  the  output  mixes  on  dry  lands  and  bottom  lands  during  the  rainy 
season.  This is done in Table A.3 (Appendix A).  Sorghum is most frequently grown on the 
dry lands, followed by groundnuts, millet, maize, and cotton.  By contrast, rice is by far the 
most important crop grown on the bottom lands, but if we look at the situation in terms of 
cultivated area, maize is more or less at par with rice. 
 
3. Input and output data 
Measurement procedures and problems 
The crop pattern adopted by the sample farms is even more complex than what the above 
presentation suggests, leading to tricky measurement problems that need to be discussed in 
detail. Over a particular season (rainy or dry), our data show that, by subdividing a plot, a 
farmer can plant as many as eight different crops. In addition, given the possibility of inter-
cropping, there exist additional combinations of crops that can be adopted on a plot.  In 
comparing  land  yields  between  collective  and  individual  plots,  we  can  use  either  crop-
specific physical yield measures or an aggregate monetary measure that takes into account all 
the crops grown on one plot. While the former approach considers crop choice decisions as 
exogenous, the latter allows for the possibility that yields vary from plot to plot because of 
differences in the crop mixes selected by the farmer.  Our empirical strategy will follow both 
approaches. 
The practical difficulties in implementing them are considerable, not only because of the 
amount of data to deal with, but also because of the heterogeneity of the measurement units 11 
 
used in each village (sometimes in each household) to report physical quantities of produce 
harvested and sold.  We have therefore spent quite an important amount of time to express in 
kilograms the various reported measures of crop quantities (such as the cartload, the tin, the 
box, the plate, the handful, etc.), which may themselves be differently defined depending on 
the village where they are used.  In the case of some crops, hopefully minor crops (e.g., 
cassava, taro, tobacco, cashew nuts, salads, bissam, and fruits), we could not find a proper 
way  to  convert    the  harvested  amount  to  a  single  measurement  unit  and  have  therefore 
decided to keep them out of the analysis (which implies that the afferent cultivation areas 
have also been left out).   
Price data are likewise complex since the harvest of a given plot may have been disposed of 
at  different  points  in  time  and  a  portion  may  have  been  retained  for  self-consumption 
purposes.  The strategy followed consisted of using the price reported by the farmer for the 
most  substantial  sale  and  to  value  the  entire  harvest  of  a  given  crop  on  that  basis.    An 
alternative solution could have consisted in calculating the median price obtained for each 
crop over the whole sample area and use those prices for valuate the quantities produced 
everywhere.  Unfortunately, this option did not turn out to be feasible for the aforementioned 
reason that, owing to the great heterogeneity of physical measurement units, we could only 
derive unit prices (prices per kilogram) for the most common crops, that is, seven out of 
forty-one  different  crops  found  in  our  sample.    Evaluating  in  monetary  terms  the  entire 
production was nevertheless possible since most respondents supplied us with homogeneous 
quantity and price information (quantity and price per tin, for example).  
Two last remarks deserve to be made.  While computing the yields per hectare, we divide the 
production value or quantity by the area actually cultivated
4 after subtracting the area devoted 
to crops for which we lack crucial information (see above).  Furthermore, wary of double 
counting cultivated areas, we avoided to count an area twice when it was cultivated both 
during the dry and the rainy seasons, or when it was allocated to inter-cropping. 
Measuring the inputs used in agricultural production proved to be as complex as measuring 
the outputs.  Data about chemical fertilizers were collected on a plot basis. We then had to 
add up quantities of various fertilizers applied at several points of time and to value them at 
the reported prices.  When fertilizers were acquired from the CMDT (“Compagnie Malienne 
pour le Développement des Textiles”), a public agency in charge of marketing cotton and 
                                                           
4 It implies that fallow land area is not taken into account in our yield computation. Note incidentally 
that fallow practice is seldom in the survey area, most of the sample plots have not been left in fallow 
for the last five years.  12 
 
cereal fertilizers, prices were uniform over our study area.  When, on the other hand, they 
were purchased from private traders, we chose to apply the median price calculated over the 
whole sample in order to minimize measurement noise.  Data about organic fertilizers are 
unfortunately unavailable.  However, we know that this input has a significant impact on 
production only if it can be applied in sufficient quantity and quality. Our field observations 
have suggested that this condition remains typically non-satisfied.
5  Nowhere could we thus 
note the presence of manure pits on the farm sites.  In the best of cases, farmers use animal 
dung to fertilize their fields.  To take this possibility into account, we will then use the size of 
the cattle herd as a proxy for organic manure applied on the collective fields.    
Regarding seeds, the main point is that, except for cotton, the sample farmers do not seem to 
buy improved seed varieties as most of them use self-generated seeds.  We have ignored 
cotton seeds altogether because quantities applied are standardized and actually fixed by the 
CMDT on a per hectare basis.  Finally, concerning agricultural equipment, our data enable us 
to  discern  whether  a  household  owns  at  least  a  pair  of  oxen  and  a  plough  (nobody  was 
observed  to  have  any  mechanical  equipment  in  the  survey  area).  We  also  know  when  a 
household has rented these draught animals. 
The most problematic input is labour.  To be meaningful, indeed, a measure of labour inputs 
should provide information about effective labour use or effort (labour in efficiency units).  
Nominal units of labour time are not of much help because they may conceal quite different 
amounts of effort.  We know that there are rules enforced by the head, varying from village to 
village and from household to household, that prescribe the nominal amount of work to be 
performed on the common fields by their household members or, conversely, the amount of 
time that they are residually allowed to devote to the cultivation of their private plots.  Yet, 
the heads themselves are well aware that there is a long way between a nominal and an 
effective  allocation  of  labour  effort  between  common  and  individual  plots.    Revealingly, 
when queried about the best ways to improve yields on the collective fields, the household 
heads  have  mentioned  enhancing  the  quality  of  labour  efforts  together  with  greater 
application of organic fertilizers and better access to water. 
This being said, even the nominal amounts of time spent working were so hard to collect, that 
they were unreliable.  This is largely due to the fact that farmers may split their time between 
several fields (in mixed farms especially) and between different parcels within each field. 
                                                           
5 It is estimated that in order to restore soil fertility in the area a minimum of ten tons of organic 
fertilizers per hectare should be applied (personal communication of field agronomists working in the 
area). 13 
 
Moreover, the time allocation across fields and crops may vary significantly depending on the 
agricultural calendar.  In fact, the only information that we could reliably elicit from the 
respondents regarding labour inputs is who works on the common fields and who works on 
each individual plot, and whether they have hired labour to help them cultivating their fields.  
Such  a  paucity  of  data  prevents  us  from  comparing  labour  efforts  between  common  and 
private plots, and between male and female individual plots.  As a result, we will only be able 
to  infer  relative  labour  intensities  from  an  analysis  of  comparative  land  yields  between 
collective and individual plots, in which other complementary inputs are duly controlled.  In 
other words, if our results show any significant yields differential between the two types of 
plots while controlling for plot’s and farmer’s characteristics, for complementary inputs, and 
for crop and household fixed effects, we could then assume that the labour input causes this 
difference. At this juncture, it deserves to be emphasized that on the face of it the constraints 
imposed by the heads on members regarding the time they are allowed to work on their 
private plots (during the rainy season when there is potential competition between common 
and private plots) are often quite tight
6: male members are granted only one day (the rest day) 
or  two  days  a  week  for  private  work  in  42  percent  and  15  percent  of  the  households, 
respectively.  Men  have  the  permission  to  work  for  themselves  each  and  every  day  (in 
addition, possibly, to the rest day) but only before and after the prescribed time of work on 
the  common  fields  (typically  the  best  coolest  hours  of  daytime  -before  sunrise  and  after 
sunset-) in 15 percent of the sample households.  In the remaining cases (28 percent), which 
refer mainly to household heads and their brothers, they are allowed to work on their private 
fields more or less freely.   Female members are granted more freedom to cultivate their 
individual fields, the production of which is partly consumed by the household.  For them, we 
obtain the following figures: 22, 13, 22, and 43 percent, respectively.  The answers provided 
for male members clearly suggest that labour time allocation rules tend to be unfavourable to 
the cultivation of private plots: therefore, if land yields are comparatively high on the latter, 
this would indicate that intensity of labour effort on them is markedly larger than on common 
fields (controlling for land’s characteristics and other complementary inputs). 
                                                           
6 Lallemand (1977, p.46), an anthropologist also mention the existence of such a rule in Burkina Faso.  14 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table A.4 (see Appendix A) presents descriptive statistics for key output and input variables 
used in our empirical analysis.  It comprises several blocks.  Yields expressed in money value 
in  FCFA  (Francs  issued  by  the  “Communauté  Financière  Africaine”),  and  crop-specific 
physical yields are displayed in the first and second blocks, respectively.  The third block 
includes  different  measures  of  farming  areas,  and  the  fourth  block  reports  information 
regarding the various inputs used.  For each block, aggregate figures for the whole sample are 
provided  side  by  side  with  figures  that  are  obtained  for  each  type  of  plot  (common  or 
individual, and male or female).  
In terms of gross monetary yields, private plots appear to be about four times as productive as 
the common plots, and this gap persists if yields are computed net of the expenses incurred 
on chemical inputs.  The difference in land productivity between common and private plots is 
observed with more or less the same magnitude whether we consider dry lands or bottom 
lands  separately.    As  expected,  yields  on  the  higher  quality  land,  bottom  lands,  are 
considerably higher than on dry lands, and this is true for common fields as well as for 
private plots, whether male or female.   
When a distinction is made between the main care-intensive crops
7 (rice, groundnuts, maize, 
cotton, and onions) on one hand, and traditional (subsistence) crops (millet and sorghum) on 
the other hand, a striking difference emerges: while yields on common fields are significantly 
smaller than yields on private plots for the former, they are roughly similar for the latter.   
This observation is broadly confirmed when we look at crop-specific physical yields.  There 
is thus no statistically significant difference between yields on common and private plots for 
millet and sorghum while there is a marked difference for groundnuts, rice, and maize.  The 
difference also exists for cotton and onions, yet it is not statistically significant because of the 
small number of observations made on one type of plot (common plots for onions and private 
plots for cotton). According to these various measures, male individual plots often turn out to 
be more productive than female plots.  The third block contains information that has already 
been partly summarized in Table 2. We also learn there that the average size of a bottom land 
plot is considerably smaller than that of a dry land plot.  Moreover, the advantage of common 
fields in terms of plot area holds whether we consider traditional or care-intensive crops.   
                                                           
7 Care-intensive crops are crops for which quality of labour plays an important role, all through the 
agricultural seasons, in the form of careful application of fertilizers, diligent weeding, proper land 
management, row planting, etc.   15 
 
Regarding  the  last  block,  it  is  noteworthy  that  total  expenses  on  chemical  inputs  are 
significantly larger for private plots than for common fields, and for male private plots than 
for female plots.  While chemical fertilizers applied to common fields come in more or less 
equal proportions from  the CMDT and private  traders, those used on private plots come 
almost  exclusively  from  the  latter.    This  is  an  important  finding  because  modern  inputs 
acquired from the CMDT (through the channel of local farmer associations “Associations 
Villageoises”) are repaid after the harvest
8 whereas those acquired from private traders must 
typically be paid cash.  Two last observations deserve to be emphasized.  First, hardly 15 
percent of individual plots have benefitted from the services of rented capital, mainly draught 
animals.    This  recourse  to  rented  animals  and  plough  is  generally  made  by  individual 
members who do not have easy access to the equipment of the household.  Second, land 
tenure security as measured by the right to plant trees is stronger on common fields than on 
private plots and, concerning the latter, it is stronger for men than for women. 
Two  last  comments  deserve  to  be  made  regarding  another  available  measure  of  the  land 
quality. We know whether or not a plot was lying fallow for at least one year over the last 
five years. Information related to this latter variable is displayed in Table A.5 (see Appendix 
A). It reveals that first, only 17.5 percent of collective plots were lying fallow for a minimum 
of one  year over that period and it is important to note that 86% of them belong to the 
household head. As for the private plots, their holders have never declared that their plot lied 
fallow over the last five years. Note that only 2.3% of these farmers are the owners of the 
plots they cultivate. Second, collective plots which have lied fallow for at least one year over 
the past five years seem to be less productive than those which have been cultivated without 
resting during the same five year period. We are then tempted to believe that collective plots 
which lie fallow are of less quality than those which are cultivated every year. However, we 
cannot say that an individual plot is systematically of better quality because it rarely (never) 
lies fallow. Indeed, the individual plot holders do not practice fallow period on their plots 
since they suffer from a land security problem: fallow individual land might be claimed back 
by its owner (remember that only 2.3% of the individual plots belong to individual farmer).  
                                                           
8 The value of the chemical inputs is subtracted from the proceeds paid to the farmer by the CMDT 
which acts as an exclusive purchaser of cotton produce (in 2007). 16 
 
4. Econometric results: plot-level differentials in land productivity 
From  the  above  observations,  it  appears  that  compared  to  the  common  fields,  land 
productivity is larger on individual plots that are also smaller in size, of a higher quality 
(higher proportion of bottom land), and to which greater quantities of chemical inputs are 
applied.  In this section, we first want to check whether the superiority of individual plots in 
terms of productivity remains after controlling for the intrinsic characteristics of the plots, 
that is, their area, quality, location, and the extent of land rights.  This implies that we do not 
control for variables that potentially reflect strategic choices by the farmers.   
In a second step, we do introduce these controls measured by crop choices and the use of 
non-labour inputs.  The former dimension is taken into account in order to allow for the 
possibility that holders of individual plots make more profitable crop choices since they are 
presumably less subject to the constraint of providing foodstuffs used in family consumption.  
As regards the latter, we need to consider the contribution of material inputs to production to 
determine whether land productivity differentials subsist and, if yes, which theory is best able 
to account for them.  If the Kanzianga/Wahhaj (2010) hypothesis is true, one should observe 
a reversal of the direction of the land productivity differential: private plots become less 
productive than common fields once the intrinsic characteristics of the plot and the role of all 
complementary inputs except labour are taken into account.  It could then be inferred, as 
these authors have done in their own empirical study, that the productivity advantage of 
common  fields  stems  from  a  better  application  of  labour  efforts.  Conversely,  if  the 
Guirkinger/Platteau  (2011a)  hypothesis  is  true,  we  should  not  observe  any  such  reversal: 
because effort incentives are distorted on the common fields, private plots should remain 
more productive even after allowing for the contribution of non-labour inputs.  
In this section, we use a simple OLS model on our most disaggregated data, measured at the 
plot level.  In accordance with the two-step empirical strategy highlighted above, we estimate 
the two following equations: 
1 2 3 4 5 (1) _ _ _
_
ijh ijh ijh ijh ijh ijh
ijh jh h ijh
Y female plot common plot area location land rights
quality farmer charact HH
a b b b b b
h g w e
= + + + + +
+ + + +
 
1 2 3 4 5 (2) _ _ _
_ _ _
ijh ijh ijh ijh ijh ijh
ijh ijh jh ijh h ijh
Y female plot common plot area location land rights
quality nonfam labour input farmer charact CROP HH
a b b b b b
h c g d w e
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
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in which  ijh Y  is the money value of the production per hectare of plot i, cultivated by farmer j, 
belonging  to  household  h.  The  intrinsic  characteristics  of  a  plot  are  described  by  the 
following variables: three dummy variables indicating the type of land plot, the first one is 
male private plot (the reference category), the second is female private plot, and the third is 
common plot;  ijh area , the land area measured either continuously (in ha) or categorically (in 
quartiles);  ijh location ,  a  continuous  variable  measuring  the  amount  of  time  (in  minutes) 
needed  to  cover  by  walk  the  distance  between  the  plot  and  the  farmstead;  and  finally, 
_ ijh land rights  , a binary variable which is equal to one if the farmer is allowed to plant trees, 
and to zero otherwise ; and finally  ijh quality , a vector of two dummy variables, the first one, 
bottom,  takes on value one if the land is of high quality and value zero if it is dry, then a 
dummy labeled fallow_5years with value one if the plot was lying fallow at least once during 
the last five years, and zero if the fallow on that plot dates from more than five years ago. As 
for the farmer’s intrinsic characteristics, they include his/her age; his/her level of education
9, 
which is a binary variable equals to one if the farmer completed primary education and zero 
otherwise
10.  In this first estimation, to control for unobserved household characteristics, we 
allow  for  household  fixed  effects,  h HH ,  a  vector  of  dummy  variables  that  identify  each 
household of the sample. Finally, ijh e , are the robust standard errors clustered at the household 
level. 
In our second estimation, we add a vector ( _ _ ijh nonfam labour input ) of non-family labour 
input variables  such as  chemicalinputs which measures the expenses on chemical inputs, 
and two other binary variables related to the possible recourse of the farmer to externally-
provided productive services,  hiringlabour  which is equal to one if the farmer has hired 
outside labour, and  rentingequipment which equals one if the farmer has rented in draught 
animals and a plough. In this second estimation, we allow for crop fixed effects, ijh CROP , a 
vector of dummy variables for each crop grown on a specific plot, so as to control for the 
possibility that holders of individual plots make more profitable crop choices
11.  
                                                           
9 For collective plots, we use the age and the level of education of the household head.   
10  In  the  sample  area,  the  average  level  of  education  is  extremely  low:    85.5%  of  our  sample 
individuals have never been to school, and only 2.5% of the sample farmers have their primary school 
degree.  
11 We include 14 crop dummies which are the most frequent crops grown and/or crops cultivated on a 
relatively large area (more than half an hectare). 18 
 
The results are presented in Table 4.  In the first column, we display the results that are 
obtained when equation (1) is estimated and land area is measured continuously.   In the 
second column, the latter is measured with the help of a categorical variable based on a 
distribution in quartiles.  The third column presents the results based on equation (2), with 
land area measured continuously, and the fourth column presents the same with land area 
measured categorically.    
From columns (1) and (2), it is evident that, controlling for plot size and land quality in 
particular, male private plots have a significantly higher productivity than female plots and 
common fields. Incidentally, this finding is not consistent with the idea that common fields 
benefit from scale economies.  Land quality and the extent of rights held over the plot turn 
out to have a positive effect on land productivity.  These results continue to hold when plot 
size is measured categorically  and it now  appears that comparatively large plots are less 
productive than plots belonging to the lowest end (quartile) of the distribution.  Provided that 
land  quality  is  properly  measured,  the  latter  result  supports  the  view  that  the  inverse 
relationship between land size and productivity, well-known in the agricultural economics 
and  development  literature,  stems  from  input  market  imperfections  rather  than  from 
differences in quality (Bhalla, 1988).  The greater productivity of plots benefiting from higher 
land  tenure  security  is  consonant  with  our  expectation  based  on  the  existing  literature 
(Besley, 1995; Brasselle et al., 2002).  19 
 
Table 4: Plot yield estimation using an OLS model  
Dependant variable: Plot yield in value terms (FCFA/ha) 
 
 

























Area  1906.5 
(8022.5) 
  -10066.6 
(12036.8) 
 
Squared area   349.5 
(330.9) 




nd quartile    -191509.4*** 
(64842.2) 
  -64243.1 
(85967.8) 
3
rd quartile    -190763.6*** 
(56280.1) 
  -120048.2* 
(68755.3) 
4
th quartile    -135876.9*** 
(63031.6) 
  -155129.8* 
(83802.5) 




































































Crop FE  No   No  Yes  Yes 
Household FE  Yes  Yes   Yes   Yes  
Nr of observations  895  895  895  895 
Nr of clusters  202  202  202  202 
R-squared  30.7  31.4  48.8  48.9 
Significant at ***1%, **5% *10%; robust standard errors clustered at household level in parenthesis 
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The relatively low productivity of the common fields is confirmed when taking into account 
of the non-labour inputs used in the production and when crop fixed effects are introduced 
(see columns 3 and 4 of Table 4).  In other words, for plots owned by the same household, 
with  similar  characteristics,  and  planted  to  the  same  crop(s),  those  which  are  farmed 
individually prove to be more productive than those farmed collectively. Bear in mind that, 
given the rule followed by the head awarding private plots, these plots are not suspect of 
having been attributed to more dynamic members within the household (see supra).  It is 
worth  pointing  out  that  the  coefficient  of  common  plot  in  estimation  (2.a)  remains  quite 
large
12 even after having added all the necessary controls.  On the other hand, the advantage 
of men over women with respect to their private plots vanishes. The fact that coefficient of 
female private plot remains insignificant whether we drop crop fixed effects while keeping 
the material inputs as explanatory variables or, conversely, we keep the crop fixed effects 
while removing the material inputs from the regression tends to indicate that the above two 
factors are at play. These latter results tend to suggest that women have less recourse to 
material inputs and do not make optimal crop choices, which is not surprising to the extent 
that  they  are  expected  to  provide  ingredients  for  collective  meals  (see  supra).    Note 
incidentally that if we remove the land security variable, the coefficient of female private plot 
becomes nearly significant.
13   
It could be objected that the relationship between the type of plot and land productivity is 
spurious owing to rough measurement of our land quality variable: the type of plot would be 
a proxy for a sort of land quality that we do not measure and, if private plots are of a better 
quality than the common fields, they give rise to higher yields.  Fortunately, we are able to 
surmount the problem of rough measurement of land quality through the use of crop fixed 
effects.  The underlying idea is that there exists a strong relationship between the type of crop 
grown and land quality, so that controlling for the former is about equivalent to controlling 
for the latter.  It is thus revealing that in his study of Burkina Faso, a country very similar to 
Mali (both are Sahelian, neighbouring countries), Udry (1996) has shown that “the primary 
impact of the soil type and location variables runs through the choice of which crop to plant 
on a given plot.  Much of the effect of these characteristics, therefore, is picked up by the 
                                                           
12 The productivity (per ha) premium of a male private plot compared to a common plot with similar 
characteristics is, on average, 144,038 FCFA (219.6 €).  Bearing in mind that in Mali the PPP annual 
income per capita is 778.6€ (WDR, 2010), the advantage of farming a private plot is non negligible.  
13 If we re-estimate the regression presented in Table 4, column (4), using female private plot as the 
reference category for the type of plot variable, we find that neither the coefficient of common plot, 
nor the coefficient of male private plot  are significantly different from zero.     21 
 
household-year-crop effects in the regressions.  There is a very strong correlation between 
both the location and the soil type of a plot and the crop planted on that plot” (p. 1025).   
In order to test the robustness of our results when we control for land quality through the crop 
effect, we have re-estimated equation (2) for two specific crops.  These crops are groundnuts 
and sorghum which present the nice features of being simultaneously grown on the three 
types of plots in a sufficiently large number of cases, and of being mostly grown on dry 
lands.    The  dependent  variable  is  now  a  physical  measure  of  land  productivity.  And  the 
sample is now reduced to mixed structure only. Since the number of households in which 
there  are  both  collective  and  individual  (male)  plots  allotted  to  groundnut  cultivation  is 
limited, we do not control for household fixed effects but for village fixed effects instead.  
This means that we compare yields on private and collective plots across households within a 
particular village.
14   
As can be seen from the first column of Table 5, the estimation for groundnuts cultivation, 
the  central  results  reported  above  continue  to  hold  when  we  control  for  quality  in  the 
aforementioned way (dry versus bottom lands).  However, the difference in physical harvest 
is no more observed between male private and common plots when sorghum cultivation is 
considered (Table 5, column (2).  When we restrict the sample to low-quality plots (dry 
lands) where groundnuts and sorghum are mostly grown, we find similar results (not shown).  
Along  the  same  line,  we  have  clubbed  together  all  the  care-intensive  crops  –groundnuts, 
cotton, rice, maize, and onions−, which also happen to be cash crops, and re-constructed our 
dependent variable defined in value terms.  When we re-estimate equation (2), we find again 
that  our  results  stand  whether  we  control  or  not  for  crop  fixed  effects  and  whether  we 
measure land area in total or with a discrete variable (see Table 5, columns (3), (4) and (5)): 
common fields tend to be less productive than male private plots. Interestingly, comparing 
results in the same columns shows that the coefficients of the bottom land dummy stop being 
statistically  significant  once  we  add  crop  fixed  effects  and  the  land  area  measured  in 
quartiles.  This suggests that with such controls we are relatively successful in picking up 
variations in land quality.  
When we club together the other main crops, sorghum and millet (both subsistence crops), we 
see  that  our  result  does  not  hold  anymore  (see  Table  5,  column  (6)).    The  latter,  non-
                                                           
14 When attention is restricted only to households in which groundnuts are grown on both types of 
plots (male individual and common plots), the sample size is reduced to 26 households, which is 
obviously a too small sample to apply inference tests.  The average yield for groundnuts grown on 
(male) private plots in these 26 households is 743.45 kg/ha which is significantly (5%) larger than the 
yield of 383.33 kg/ha obtained on the common fields. 22 
 
conclusive  finding  actually  suggests  that  the  kind  of  incentive  problems  mentioned  by 
Guirkinger/Platteau  (2011a)  exist  only  when  crops  require  efforts  of  a  minimum  quality.  
Upon second thoughts, this is not a surprising result: efficiency losses caused by incentive 
problems are not likely to be severe when effort quality is low and monitoring is, therefore, 
relatively easy. To verify the intuition behind the argument made by Guirkinger/Platteau, we 
ideally want to have a stronger test that would enable us to directly check the existence of the 
precise type of incentive problem assumed to plague collective production.  This will be 
attempted in the next section.   
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Table 5: Crop-specific plot yield estimations 
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th quartile          -299251.9** 
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Crop FE  No   No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Household FE  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Village FE  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Nr of observation  195  271  620  620  620  429 
Nr of clusters  89  129  198  198  198  196 
R-squared  26.1  9.1  49.2  48.7  50.2  52.8 
Significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%; robust standard errors clustered at household level in parenthesis 
a Cotton, maize, rice, onion, groundnuts; 
b Sorghum and millet 
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Before embarking on this task, however, we need to mention a few robustness checks carried 
out on the basis of equation (2).  First, we re-estimate the model on the basis of a restricted 
sample (of 830 plots) from which we have removed all the purely collective farms (farms in 
which there are collective plots only).  This is because we want to avoid mixing collective 
plots that are subject to competition caused by the presence of private plots and collective 
plots  that  are  immune  to  such  a  competitive  effect  (in  the  use  of  labour).    Second,  and 
essentially for the same reason, attention is restricted to households in which the three types 
of plots coexist (sample size is then reduced to 302 plots).  Whether the former or the latter 
procedure is followed, we find that plots with similar characteristics, planted to the same crop 
by the same household exhibit higher productivity when cultivated individually  (by male 
members) than when cultivated collectively (results not shown).  
Third, it is possible that the superiority of private plots exists only for certain values of the 
plot area.  To check this possibility, we add to the list of explanatory variables an interaction 
term between the area and the type of plot, a dummy with value one for collective plots and 
zero for male private plots.  We find that the coefficient of this interaction term is positive 
and statistically significant (at 10 percent), yet is considerably smaller than the (significantly 
at 5 percent) negative coefficient of the type-of-plot variable (results not shown).  In other 
words, increasing plot size has the effect of mitigating the productivity advantage of private 
over common plots. Fourth, if alternatively we directly deduct the chemical inputs expenses 
from the gross output value, and estimate this new dependant variable defined as the net 
output per ha in value term, results remain unchanged.  
Fifth, in order to check for the possibility that our results are driven by extreme values, we 
have used estimation models robust to outliers. We thus re-estimated equations (1) and (2) 
with  a  technique  which  identifies  and  downweighs  observations  associated  to  large 
residuals
15  (Verardi  and  Dehon,  2010;  Verardi  and  Croux,  2009;  Dehon,  Gassner  and 
Verardi, 2009).  Thereafter, we have run our initial regressions (equation (1) and (2)) on a 
sample from  which these identified outliers have been removed. Not only do our results 
stand, but they also turn out to be even more significant in explaining yield differentials 
between  common  and  (male)  individual  plots  (results  not  shown).    Precisely  the  same 
conclusion is reached when, instead of controlling for household fixed effects, we control for 
village fixed effects.  This is especially true in regard to the results presented in Table 4: the 
coefficients of common plot become significant at 1 percent.  Yield differentials between 
                                                           
15 The Stata commands are “mmregress”; “qregress” and “rregress”.  25 
 
different types of plots (common and male private plots) with similar characteristics, planted 
to  the  same  crop  are  more  important  across  households  in  a  same  village  than  within 
household.  
5. Econometric results: testing for the moral-hazard-in-team problem 
So far, we have shown that male private plots are more productive than common fields when 
we control for plot’s and farmer’s characteristics as well as crop choice and material inputs.  
This could suggest that the productivity advantage of private plots stems from the application 
of  more  intensive  labour  effort  conceived  as  the  residual  factor  explaining  productivity 
differentials (since we do not measure labour effort).  In this section, we move one step 
further by trying to see whether the lower yields obtained on the common fields are caused by 
the  moral-hazard-in-team  (MHT)  problem.  This  hypothesis  has  been  suggested  by  our 
interviews during which many household heads explicitly refer to the incentive problems 
plaguing collective production. On the one hand, according to many patriarchs the household 
members do not do their best while working on the collective plots, thereby causing yields to 
fall. 
16 On the other hand, it does not appear feasible to differentiate payments according to 
individual  effort  contributions  to  collective  production.  The  main  reason  put  forward  by 
family heads is that serious intra-family conflicts would inevitably result.  
Testing  the  presence  of  MHT  problem  is  a  priori  difficult  because  a  higher  number  of 
workers presumably has two simultaneous effects: (i) an additional worker gives rise to a 
greater  dilution  of  incentives  due  to  the  MHT  problem;  and  (ii)  for  given  amounts  of 
complementary production factors, he (she) causes the marginal productivity of labour to 
decrease.  As we show below, this ambiguity cannot be completely surmounted, as theory 
allows  us  only  potentially  to  discriminate  between  situations  of  first-best  efficiency  and 
situations plagued by the MHT problem. 
Let us assume that the production technology is described by a Cobb-Douglas (CD) function 
subject  to  constant,  decreasing  or  increasing  returns  to  scale.
17    Denoting  by  A  the  land 
amount  allotted  to  collective  farming  in  the  household,  by  L  the  aggregate  labour  input 
                                                           
16  For  example,  one  of  them  said  that  “more  effort  is  applied  to  the  individual  plots  and  when 
members work on the collective plot, they are tired". Another one complained that when they work on 
the collective field, his sons “are prone to keep energy in reserve for their individual plots" (“ils se 
réserevent”).  (Guirkinger and Platteau, 2011a: 12) A lot of interviewed household heads also 
mentioned that a better quality of labour would increase the collective output. 
17 Note that the results would hold with a general form of the production function, but we use a CD 
function to derive explicit expressions for the variables of interest. 26 
 
applied  to  this  land,  by  n  the  number  of  workers  assumed  to  be  identical,  and  by  l  the 
individual amount of effort (in efficiency terms), we can write: 
1 1
1 1 ( ) Y A L Y A nl
b b b b - - = ⇒ =
if  returns  to  scale  are  constant,  and  2 2 ( ) Y A L Y A nl
a b a b = ⇒ =   with  1 or a b + > <  
depending  on  whether  returns  to  scale  are  increasing  or  decreasing.  The  marginal 














- ¶   =   ¶  
, 
respectively. 
As  for  the  effort  cost  function,  it  is  assumed  to  be  convex  (standard  assumption).    Two 
alternative specifications are considered, depending on whether the marginal cost of effort is 
increasing linearly or non-linearly with the amount of effort.  We write:  
2 ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 i CT l l Cm l l g g = ® =  
3 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) 3 ii CT l l Cm l l g g = ® =  
We then derive the equilibrium amounts of individual effort obtained under the two regimes, 
−the first-best efficiency situation and the situation characterized by the MHT problem−, and 
under  the  different  combinations  of  assumptions  regarding  the  shape  of  the  effort  cost 
function and the type of returns to scale.  In the corresponding equilibrium condition, the 
MHT problem is captured by the fact that the worker receives only a share (equal to 1 n) of 
his (her) marginal productivity with the consequence that he (she) under-applies effort.  After 
plugging the equilibrium values of effort into the production function, we compute the first 
derivatives of total output with respect to n, the only labour-related data that are available to 
us.  Table 6 shows the equilibrium amounts of effort for all considered cases and Table 7 the 
values of the first derivatives of total output with respect to n.   
   27 
 
Table 6: Equilibrium levels of labour effort under the two regimes and for different labour 
cost functions 
   
    
               Cost of labour effort function 
1
st best-efficiency  With MHT problem 
Equilibrium C°: 
 
' ( ) L Y Cm l =  
Equilibrium C°: 
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Table 7: Responses of total production to a marginal increase in the number of workers (n) 
under the two regimes and for different labour cost functions 
 
  Marginal cost 
of labour effort  1
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It is evident that all the expressions for the first derivatives can be signed unambiguously.  
Just  note  that  when  increasing  (or  decreasing)  returns  to  scale  are  posited,  a  realistic 28 
 
condition  limiting  the  possible  value  of  parameter  b   needs  to  be  satisfied.    The  signs 
corresponding to each case are reported in Table 8.
18  In the same table, we also report the 
signs that are obtained when the output variable is the productivity per worker per land unit 
( ) Y
nA  instead of the aggregate output (the corresponding first derivatives are not shown).   
 
Table 8: Comparative signs of the effects of a marginal increase in the number of workers on 
total production and on productivity per person per hectare, distinguishing between first-best 
situation and situation characterized by the MHT problem 
 
               
                      
Marginal cost 
of labour effort 
1
st best-efficiency  With MHT problem 




















































































































































































A glance at Table 8 reveals that the response of aggregate output to a change in the size of the 
workforce is always positive in the first-best situations yet can be nil in the presence of the 
MHT  problem  if  the  marginal  cost  of  effort  increases  linearly  in  l  (cases  (i)  in  Table  ).  
Whether returns to scale are decreasing, constant, or increasing does not modify this contrast.  
Moreover, when we look at the last column, we note that the signs of the derivative of the 
productivity per person per hectare with respect to n is consistently negative in all the cases 
examined:  with  such  a  measure  of  productivity,  it  is  therefore  impossible  to  detect 
empirically the possible presence of a MHT problem.   
The results shown in the above table enable us to derive two predictions to empirically test 
the  presence  of  MHT  problem  on  collective  fields.    First,  if  total  output  (or  output  per 
hectare) can be shown to be unresponsive to a marginal increase in the number of workers, 
we  could  safely  conclude  that  the  MHT  problem  exists.  Second,  remember  the  finding 
                                                           
18  When  productivity  per  unit  of  land  is  considered,  the  results  are  obviously  identical  to  those 
reported for total output (since A is constant). 29 
 
obtained  in  Section  4  according  to  which  land  productivity  is  not  significantly  different 
between male private plots, on the one hand, and collective plots devoted to cultivation of 
traditional (subsistence) crops, on the other hand.  In other words, the case of subsistence 
crops provides us with a ready counterfactual to the case of care-intensive crops for which we 
expect the MHT problem to exist.  Since such a counterfactual is available, a second possible 
test of the MHT hypothesis would consist of showing that, the coefficient of the workforce 
size in the regression for care-intensive crops is significantly positive (cases (ii) in Table 8) 
but nevertheless smaller than the same coefficient in the regression for subsistence crops, 
which are easy to monitor.
19 
We first estimate a simple OLS model in which the dependent variable is the total monetary 
output obtained on a collective plot j of a household h,  ih Y :  
 
_ _ _ ih h ih h ih h ih Y nr workers plot charact head charact CROP VILLAGE a b g r d l e = + + + + + +
 
 
We control for plot characteristics, complementary inputs, household head characteristics, 
crop and village fixed effects in the same way as we have done in the previous section.  The 
critical differences between the present and the previous econometric exercises are that the 
sample  is  now  restricted  to  collective  fields  and  that  a  labour  variable,  the  nr_workers 
engaged in collective family production is included in the list of the explanatory variables.  
Moreover, in the vector of the plot characteristics, we have available a proxy for the use of 
organic fertilizers (labeled manure), which is measured by the total number of cattle heads 
owned by the household, and a dummy indicating whether the household owns a plough.  
The results are presented in column (1) of Table 9 where no distinction is made between care-
intensive  (rice,  groundnuts,  maize,  cotton  and  onions)  and  traditional  subsistence  crops 
(millet and sorghum).  In columns (2) and (3), the model is re-estimated successively for the 
former and the latter crops considered separately.    
The findings strongly suggest the presence of a MHT problem on the collective fields.  As a 
matter of fact, the coefficient of the workforce variable is not significantly different from 
zero, and is quite small, in the first two regressions while it is significantly positive in the 
third  regression  where  subsistence  crops  are  isolated.  Note  that  when  the  model  is  re-
estimated using output per person per hectare as the dependent variable, we find that, as 
                                                           
19 We can easily show that  Y
n
¶
¶  under the 1
st best efficiency is higher than   Y
n
¶
¶ obtained with the 
MHT problem (see Table 7, cases (ii)). 30 
 
expected, the coefficient of the workforce variable is negative and significant (at 1 percent 
level) in the three cases examined (results shown in Appendix B). 
It could be objected that the effect of the number of workers is spurious in so far as the size of 
the workforce is positively correlated with the number of women working on the field who 
are usually shown to be less productive than men (results usually obtained in the literature but 
not supported by our data analysis, see Table 4 and 5, supra). In order to check for this 
possibility, we have re-estimated the model taking the number of male and female workers 
instead of the total number of workers. Our results stand: the number of workers, whether 
male or female, does not significantly influence monetary output. As an additional check, we 
re-estimated the model by introducing a variable measuring the ratio of men to women. The 
results continue to hold and the coefficient of the gender ratio is negative and significant 
whereas it should have been positive if men were more productive than women.  
Since our measurement of workforce is the number of members working on the collective 
plots in general, we implicitly assumed, in the former regressions, that the head does not 
allocate the available workforce between the various collective fields
20. In order to take that 
possibility into account, we have re-estimated the model at the farm level instead of the plot 
level. This change does not seem to affect our results which are identical whether the effect 
of the workforce size is estimated at the farm or plot level.
21  
 
   
                                                           
20 We have the information on the number of workers per plot in our questionnaire but did not exploit 
this information.  As a matter of fact, in almost all sample households it turns out that all the male 
members work on all the common plots.  
21 Estimations at the farm level are less relevant since we need to aggregate plot characteristics.  31 
 
Table 9: Estimating the effects of the number of workers on total output value for all type of 
crops and distinguishing between care-intensive and subsistence crops 
 


































































































Crop FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Village FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Nr of observations  455  455  455 
Nr of clusters  201  201  201 
R-squared  77.2  86.6  34.2 
Significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%; robust standard errors clustered at household level in parenthesis 
a Cotton, maize, rice, onion, groundnuts 





It might seem strange that household heads would allow such a large workforce to operate on 
the  collective  fields  that  their  marginal  productivity  comes  down  to  zero.  The  oddity 
vanishes, however, once we realize that the logic of traditional subsistence economies differs 
from the logic of so-called ‘commercialized’ economies. As argued by Lewis (1954), Cohen 
and  Weitzman  (1975),  and  Platteau  (1991),  the  former  type  is  characterized  by  specific 
employment  and  remuneration  rules:  each  member  of  the  social  unit  (typically  a  family) 
enjoys a guaranteed access to employment on the collective farm, and receives the average 
product as reward for participation in productive activities. Since the number of claimants is 
thus fixed, optimal production corresponds to its maximum level (marginal productivity is 
zero). The same conclusion obviously obtains if members receive an institutional, customary 
wage and the family head appropriates a rent that he seeks to maximize. 
In support of the MHT hypothesis, we are actually able to complement the quantitative tests 
presented above with suggestive evidence derived from simple correlation analysis of more 
qualitative  information  available  to  us.  We  know  that  cultivation  of  individual  plots  is 
constrained by specific timing rules imposed by the household head.  If the MHT problem 
exists and the head is aware of it, we expect him to impose relatively strict rules when the 
problem is rather severe owing to the participation of numerous people in collective farming 
operations. Along this line, we construct a variable which describes the prevailing work rule 
on male individual plots.
22 Three possibilities are considered, which we rank by decreasing 
order of severity: (1) male members are allowed to work only one day a week; (2) they may 
work  before  sunrise  and  after  sunset  (that  is,  during  the  coolest  hours  of  the  day),  and 
sometimes also one day a week, or two days a week; and (3) they may work five or six days a 
week, or whenever they want.  The result, reported in Table 10, is according to expectation: 
the number of workers participating in collective production is greater in households where 
the most constraining rule is in force (see column (1)).   
Guirkinger  and  Platteau  (2010b)  have  argued  that  “the  temptation  to  free  ride  on  other 
members’ efforts on the collective fields appears to be perceptible when several married men 
work together”.  The idea is that, since the families of married men are very likely to be of 
unequal size, the way of distributing the collective output might look arbitrary to a category 
of parents: whether the head decides to distribute output equally among all sons, or to give 
shares proportionate to their family size, the rule will distort incentives (for members with 
larger family size in the former case, and for members with smaller family size in the latter).  
                                                           
22  In  some  households,  we  observe  that  the  household  head  imposes  different  rules  to  his  male 
members, for these cases, we take the stricter rule imposed as the rule in force for the household. 33 
 
In addition, it is plausible that once they get married male members tend to identify with their 
new family more than with their family of origin.  As a result, they may not feel as strongly 
tied as before to the large household unit, thereby causing a weakening of solidarity links and 
an activation of feelings of competition and rivalry.  In order to test that idea, we correlate the 
degree of severity of the time allocation rule with the number of married men, rather than the 
total number of workers on the collective field (see column (2)). We again find that the rule is 
comparatively  strict  when  the  number  of  married  men  is  higher,  and  the  statistical 
significance of the difference of means is even more conclusive than in column (1).
23   
 
Table 10: Correlation analysis of the relationship between the time allocation rule and the 
number of workers, the number of married men or the type of family 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Time allocation rules for work 
on private (male) plots (by 
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with male 
private plots 
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(3) Five or six days a week /  










(1) ≠ (2) t-test: P-value  0.112  0.022**       
(1) ≠ (3) t-test: P-value  0.109  0.076*       
Number of household       37  29  66 
 
In the same line, we check whether a relationship exists between the type of rule used by the 
head and the type of household.  The hypothesis is that a more severe rule should prevail 
when families are extended in the sense of comprising brothers and nephews.  In other words, 
a greater discipline is expected to be imposed by the head when there are more distant intra-
family  links  and,  therefore,  greater  temptation  to  free  ride  on  other  members’  efforts.  
Column (3) appears to bear out this last hypothesis: in extended families, the most severe 
time allocation rule is applied in about 60 percent of the cases, as against hardly 28 percent 
for the other families.  
                                                           
23 When, following the same logic, we measure the size of the workforce by the number of married 
male members instead of the number of workers in our regression estimate of the MHT problem, we 
again find that this variable has no significant impact on the value of collective output for care-
intensive crops whereas the influence is significantly positive for subsistence crops. 
 34 
 
Finally, under the assumption that the household head monitors effort if he is himself present 
on the collective field, we expect his presence to be more frequently observed when there is a 
higher risk of labour shirking, that is, when there are numerous workers or married men, or 
when the family is of the extended type.  Our data, however, do not confirm this hypothesis. 
On the contrary, we find that the household head participates in collective production when 
there are fewer workers available to farm the collective fields. This suggests that the presence 
of  the  head  on  these  fields  arises  more  from  the  need  to  complement  a  rather  scarce 
workforce than from the need to supervise the efforts applied by the participating members.   
6. Conclusion 
This  paper  has  clearly  established,  on  the  basis  of  first-hand  data  collected  in  Mali,  that 
significant  productivity  differentials  exist  between  collective  fields  managed  by  the 
household head for the sake of the family as a whole, on the one hand, and private plots 
managed by individual male members for their own benefit, on the other hand. Moreover, 
there is strong evidence that these differentials can be attributed to substantial variations in 
the labour effort applied to cultivation, which we do not measure directly. This conclusion is 
inferred from the fact that productivity differences subsist after controlling for plots’ and 
farmers’ characteristics, the use of complementary inputs, and for crop and household fixed 
effects.  By using crop fixed effects, we do not only control for the possible differences in 
crop choices between (male) members and the household head, but we also mitigate the 
effect of possible quality variations that are not well captured by our rather rough distinction 
between dry and bottom lands.   
The cropwise distinction has yielded an interesting finding: the productivity advantage of 
private  (male)  farming  exists  for  care-intensive  crops  yet  not  for  the  two  traditional, 
subsistence crops (millet and sorghum).  A plausible explanation for the observed superiority 
of  private  plots  in  terms  of  effort  intensity  is  the  presence  of  the  moral-hazard-in-team 
problem which distorts labour incentives on collective fields devoted to the cultivation of 
care-intensive crops. This hypothesis has been confirmed by an empirical test of the effect on 
land productivity of the number of individuals engaged in collective production. Our results 
are therefore in support of the theory of the family farm proposed by Guirkinger and Platteau 
(2011a). According to them, indeed, collective farming in the context of extended family 
farms is vulnerable to efficiency losses precisely because of the above incentive problem. 35 
 
From an efficiency point of view, purely collective family farms are thus at disadvantage 
compared with mixed farms (in which private plots coexist with common ones). Why do 
household heads accept such inefficiency losses of which they seem to be quite aware? The 
answer provided by Guirkinger and Platteau (2011a) is rent capture by the heads. Since their 
own incomes are essentially obtained from collective farming, there exists an obvious trade-
off  between  efficiency  and  rent  capture  considerations.  When  land  becomes  sufficiently 
scarce,  the  head’s  income  is  maximized  by  awarding  private  plots  to  members.  Another 
plausible explanation refers to risk considerations. To the extent that common fields act as a 
risk-pooling mechanism, their lower productivity is at the root of an efficiency-insurance 
trade-off.  At equilibrium, therefore, risk-averse members are expected to choose a mix of 
collective  and  private  plots  -in  the  way  sometimes  followed  in  agricultural  producer 
cooperatives- (Carter, 1987; Delpierre, Guirkinger, and Platteau, 2011). To the extent that 
agricultural  production  remains  plagued  by  risk,  such  an  explanation  can  explain  the 
persistence of mixed farms, but not its emergence since collective farms dominated in the 
initial situation. 
A  third  explanation  is  based  on  the  idea  that  optimal  institutional  adjustments  are  not 
instantaneous. Thus, recent adoption of care-intensive, commercialized crops which are more 
efficiently grown on private (male) plots, has not yet given rise to the required change in the 
farm  structure.  This  latter  explanation  is  not  entirely  convincing,  however.  When  private 
plots coexist with collective fields, indeed, there is no complete crop specialization between 
the former and the latter.  36 
 
Appendix A 
Table A.1 : Crop’s allocation (frequencies and average cultivated area) during the rainy season  
 
Crop 

































Cotton   122  3.67 
(3.63)  114  3.79 
(3.72)  8  2.03 
(1.26)  7  1.89 
(1.29)  1  3.00 
Millet  221  2.19 
(1.75)  205  2.33 
(1.74)  16  0.46 
(0.29)  5  0.57 
(0.42)  11  0.41 
(0.22) 
Sorghum  351  2.23 
(2.29)  264  2.79 
(2.35)  87  0.55 
(0.89)  21  1.31 
(1.35)  66  0.31 
(0.49) 
Maize  205  1.79 
(1.71)  182  1.94 
(1.74)  23  0.60 
(0.50)  15  0.69 
(0.55)  8  0.43 
(0.37) 
Rice   171  0.54 
(0.75)  29  1.01 
(1.61)  142  0.44 
(0.32)  14  0.54 
(0.58)  128  0.43 
(0.28) 
Groundnuts   254  0.57 
(0.83)  97  0.97 
(1.06)  157  0.32 
(0.51)  39  0.58 
(0.95)  118  0.24 
(0.18) 
Niebe  68  2.00 
(2.94)  47  2.75 
(3.26)  21  0.32 
(0.42)  8  0.42 
(0.65)  13  0.26 
(0.18) 
Gombo  47  0.14 
(0.13)  2  0.50   
(0.35)  45  0.12 
(0.10)  2  0.15      
(0.00)  43  0.12 
(0.10) 
Beens   41  0.41 
(0.30)  29  0.48 
(0.32)  12  0.23 
(0.15)  0  0  12  0.23 
(0.15) 
Chili   103  0.18 
(0.19)  3  0.50      
(0.00)  100  0.17 
(0.18)  36  0.17 
(0.16)  64  0.16 
(0.19) 
Ginger  37  0.29 
(0.31)  11  0.63 
(0.38)  26  0.15 
(0.10)  9  0.19 
(0.10)  17  0.12 
(0.09) 
Other crops
a  122  0.68 
(1.02)  72  1.03 
(1.21)  50  0.18 
(0.24)  21  0.29 
(0.33)  29  0.10 
(0.07) 
a onion, potato, sweet potato, fonio, tomato, bissam, salad, cabbage, cashewnuts, sesam   37 
 
Table A.2: Crop’s allocation (frequencies and average cultivated area) during the dry season (on bottom land only) 
 
Crop 

































Onion  109  0.14 
(0.13)  8  0.23 
(0.15)  101  0.13 
(0.13)  35  0.13 
(0.11)  66  0.13 
(0.14) 
groundnuts  26  0.19 
(0.16)  2  0.29  24  0.18 
(0.17)  3  0.15 
(0.04)  21  0.18 
(0.18) 
Sweet potato  35  0.23 
(0.17)  4  0.33 
(0.12)  31  0.22 
(0.17)  9  0.29 
(0.20)  22  0.19 
(0.16) 
Other crops
a  48  0.31 
(0.32)  15  0.53 
(0.43)  33  0.21 
(0.19)  18  0.25 
(0.20)  15  0.16 
(0.16) 
a potato, chili, tomato, salad, cabbage 
 38 
 




















a onion, potato, sweet potato, fonio, tomato, bissam, salad, cabbage, cashewnuts, sesam  
 
 
Type of Crop 








of the plot 
Cotton  122  3.67 
(3.63)  0  0 
Millet  219  2.21 
(1.75)  2  0.4 
(0.00) 
Sorghum  351  2.23 
(2.29)  0  0 
Maize  194  1.86 
(1.72)  11  0.66 
(0.84) 
Rice  25  0.64 
(0.57)  146  0.52 
(0.77) 
Groundnuts  244  0.59 
(0.84)  10  0.21 
(0.37) 
Niebe  65  2.08 
(2.98)  3  0.21 
(0.25) 
Gombo  29  0.17 
(0.14)  18  0.08 
(0.10) 
Beans  41  0.41 
(0.30)  0  0 
Fonio  36  0.79 
(0.50)  0  0 
Chili  62  0.21 
(0.20)  41  0.13 
(015) 
Ginger  37  0.29 
(0.31)  0  0 
Other crops
a  100  0.78 
(1.10)  22  0.23 
(0.32) 39 
 
Table A.4: Descriptive statistics of the main variables. 
  Total  Collective Plot 
(CP) 
Individual Plot 





Plot (FIP)  P-Val 
MIP><FIP 
P-Val 




















(1) Monetary Yields (FCFA/ha) 
Total yield  243 110.4 
(21 654.4)  979  85 564.1 
(6 511.0)  459  382 175.3 
(39 383.8)  520  0.000  520 687 
(91 134.1)  149  326 546.3 
(41 061)  371  0.013  0.000 
Yield  net of 
fertilizer cost 
218 284.2 
(20 839.8)  979  67 366.0 
(5 823.2)  459  351 498.4 
(37 966.1)  520  0.000  474 883.1 
(87 333.9)  149  301 945.0 
(39 816.4)  371  0.020  0.000 
Yield for dry land  94 636.6 
(5 572.7)  672  65 559.3 
(2 657.3)  414  136 527.2 
(13 211.1)  258  0.000  183 926.5 
27 923.4)  79  115 607.7 
(14 296.3)  179  0.008  0.000 
Yield for bottom 
land 
572 115.8 
(64 181.7)  307  269 608.2 
(55 176.1)  45  624 073.2 
(74 165.3)  262  0.025  900 745.3 
(181 594.3)  70  523 203.1 
(75 591.4)  192  0.012  0.000 




(23979.9)  680  100 691.9 
(6 289.9)  287  304 986.6 
(40 711.6)  393  0.000  499 738.1 
(144 465.2)  94  243 760.4 





(2 989.3)  447  47 959.2 
(2 927.7)  348  47 600.2 
(8 770.9)  99  0.480  57 518.5 
(12 236.0)  23  44 598.6 
(10 822.9)  76  0.268  0.209 
(2) Physical Yields (kg/ha)   
Cotton  896.87 
(44.13)  122  887.55 
(46.55)  114  1029.76 
(79.78)  8  0.214  1057.82 
(85.98)  7  833.33 (0)  1  /  0.187 
Millet  691.91 
(50.82)  221  692.75 
(53.31)  205  681.74 
(169.95)  16  0.477  746.66  5  654.69  12  0.407  0.438 
Sorghum  586.09 
(42.73)  351  593.73 
(46.14)  264  563.16 
(100.72)  87  0.379  755.17 
(176.23)  21  502.97 
(119.94)  67  0.144  0.173 
Maize  1100.41 
(56.78)  205  1080.20 
(59.58)  182  1260.33 
(184.46)  23  0.159  1437.78 
(255.86)  15  927.60 
(194.15)  8  0.097  0.053 
Rice  2 243.27 
(279.91)  171  1 280.38 
(430.13)  29  2 439.92 
(323.48)  142  0.060  2369.05 
(873.23)  14  2447.67 
(346.90)  128  0.471  0.107 
Onion  3115.50 
(481.42)  109  1912.88 
(70.61)  8  3210.76 
(515.88)  101  0.243  4150.44 
(1155.16)  35  2712.45 
(495.36)  66  0.093  0.184 
Groundnuts (kg/ha)  507.3 
(36.6)  254  384.2 
(31.8)  97  583.4 
(54.2)  157  0.004  729.52 
(126.88)  39  530.47 
(58.56)  119  0.057  0.000 
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(3) farming areas (ha)   
Cultivated area  2.35 
(0.12)  1023  4.43 
(0.23)  488  0.44 
(0.03)  535  0.000  0.66 
(0.10)  154  0.35 
(0.02)  381  0.000  0.000 
Dry land cultivated 
area 
3.38 
(0.18)  672  5.11 
(0.26)  414  0.60 
(0.07)  258  0.000  1.03 
(0.18)  79  0.41 
(0.05)  179  0.000  0.000 
Bottom land  
cultivated area 
0.42 
(0.04)  307  1.06 
(0.26)  45  0.31 
(0.02)  262  0.000  0.30 
(0.04)  70  0.32 





0.12)  680  3.17 
(0.24)  287  0.40 
(0.12)  393  0.000  0.62 
(0.12)  94  0.33 





(0.13)  447  3.45 
(0.15)  348  0.57 
(0.09)  99  0.000  1.32 
(0.27)  23  0.34 
(0.05)  76  0.000  0.000 




(1.42)  979  29.85 
(2.63)  459  3.36 
(1.09)  520  0.000  9.76 
(3.64)  149  0.79 




(8.51)  979  29.63 
(4.54)  459  93.83 
(14.40)  520  0.000  149.53 
(30.60)  149  71.46 




(2 257.7)  979  14 803.5 
(1232.17)  459  25 749.8 
(4 097.9)  520  0.007  42 470.5 
(8 308.4)  149  19 034.4 




(523.3)  979  3 394.5 
(406.0)  459  4 927.1 
(917.1)  520  0.072  3 333.3 
(1 520.5)  149  5 567.1 




(2 445.1)  979  18 198.0 
(1 376.2)  459  30 676.8 
(4 426.6)  520  0.005  45 803.9 
(9 020.8)  149  24 601.6 
(5 010.3)  371  0.015  0.000 
Hiring labour 
 (%)   27.8  1016  28.4  486  27.4  530  0.713  19.1  152  30.7  378  0.007  0.023 
Rent in equipment 
(% )  10.2  /  6.0  /  14.1  /  0.000  6.6  /  17.2  /  0.002  0.783 
Right to plant a tree 
(%)  65.3  /  84.3  /  47.9  /  0.000  69.7  /  39.1  /  0.000  0.000 
Localization of the 
plot (min)  
23.6 
(0.9)  1001  22.9 
(1.3)  487  24.2 
(1.2)  514  0.440  16.78 
(1.71)  154  27.42 




(0.5)  985  56.2 
(0.6)  487  41.04 
(0.7)  498  0.000  38.66 
(1.23)  117  41.77 
(0.88)  381  0.036  0.000 
a Cotton, maize, rice, onion, groundnuts; 
b Millet, sorghum 41 
 
Table A.5: distinction between plots which were lying fallow at least one year over the last 
five years and those which have been cultivated every year. 
 









for CP (FCFA) 
Plots  cultivated every year  






(100.0)  89210.7 
Plots which were lying fallow 






(0)  66799.1 
P-value    0.107 




Table B.1: Estimating the effects of the number of workers on yield per worker in value term 
for all type of crops and distinguishing between care-intensive and subsistence crops 
 


































































































Crop FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Village FE  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Nr of observations  455  286  345 
Nr of clusters  201  190  195 
R-squared  45.6  35.8  23.6 
Significant at ***1%, **5%, *10%; robust standard errors clustered at household level in parenthesis 
a Cotton, maize, rice, onion, groundnuts 
b Sorghum and millet 
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